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The 1996 Telecommunications Act:
Ten Years Later
Pat Aufderheide*
Like all legislation, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996
Act") was justified on the basis of the public interest. And as in many
legislative processes, the public interest was interpreted by each
stakeholder group as coterminous with its own, while think tanks and
policy advocates jockeyed for position, sniped at ideological foes, and-for
those not acting as fronts for corporate stakeholders-mostly failed to
mobilize large enough constituencies to substitute for the large bank
accounts that commercial stakeholders drew on to impress legislators.
The 1996 Act created Frankenstein telecommunications policy with
discontinuous parts stitched together. It was, however, grounded in a
general (and incompletely observed) principle, articulated in Title IV:
increased competition--especially across traditional platforms-for
provision of both communications and media services among large players,
was effectively a good enough measure of the public interest. Consumer
choice was an acceptable stand-in for the stake of the American public in
its own telecommunications infrastructure-the neural network of
democratic life.
By its own standards in Title IV, the 1996 Act failed by not
generating intersector competition for similar services. Ironically,
consumers do have more choices both of media and telecommunications
services than they did in 1995, but with little help from the 1996 Act.
Those changes have been fueled by the vastly expanding possibilities of the
Internet and digital communication. However, today's overstimulated
*Pat Aufderheide is a professor and the director of the Center for Social Media in the School
of Communication at American University in Washington, D.C., and author of
Communications Policy and the Public Interest: The Telecommunications Act of 1996
(Guilford Press).
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
media environment calls into question, at a deeper level than the 1996 Act
engaged, the competition-is-a-good-enough-measure principle on which the
1996 Act's innovations were justified.
The failures were easy to see from early on. Cross-platform
competition was not generated from the 1996 Act's provisions. Open video
systems ("OVS") never happened. Telephone companies, so eager before
the 1996 Act to leap into video delivery, suddenly decided to buy each
other out instead, and the survivors are only now dipping their toes into
video provision. Telephone incumbents found every reason to delay or
obstruct the new right of competitors to hook up to their systems. Cable
companies, which had seemed poised to offer phone service, after the fact,
decided to consolidate their cable holdings. Broadband deployment
proceeded at a stately pace in both phone and cable, and at a relatively low
level of bandwidth provision. Radio became vastly more consolidated,
which sometimes meant that communities received more of the handful of
overlapping standard formats, but it did not give them more competing
businesses or new formats to choose from. Television broadcasters
dawdled about building their digital channel capacity, while the larger
companies bulked up and further diminished their local presence.
Quality went down; cable customer complaints rose again after the
1992 Cable Act had reined them in and telephone company services lost
the expectation of reliability. The junk ratio went way up on radio and TV,
while local, niche, minority, and emergent programs at the edges of popular
consciousness went off the air. And no one envied the people of Minot,
North Dakota, when in the middle of the night a train derailment resulted in
a chemical spill, but no one was at the remote-controlled, Clear Channel-
owned local radio station designated as an emergency broadcaster. The
vision of ex-monopolist behemoths lumbering into a competitive
marketplace has failed for multiple reasons. In some cases, for instance in
cable, legislators were snookered by large companies' claims that high-tech
paradigm shift was around the corner if only they would be granted special
favors. Further, in the instance of competitive telephony, legislators
ineffectually passed on the problems of guidelines and enforcement for
rules that challenged powerful incumbents to an underfunded Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"). In still others, such as radio and
TV, legislators simply trusted that unspecified good things would happen
from bulking up.
Another big lesson of the 1996 Act, much harder to see by staring
close up at the telecommunications policy process, was that calling
competition a good enough synonym for the public interest simply masked
the real policy challenges in making sure that communications services
function well for democratic culture and for the public that is the only
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guarantor of such culture.
The public-in the sense of active participants in the ordinary
problem solving of daily life of an open society, in the sense of people who
can count on knowing what the important problems facing society are and
can count on being able to use communications services to address them, in
the sense of a public described by the great American philosopher John
Deweyl]-was not even in the discussion. It was convenient for the leading
stakeholders to ignore the need of a democracy for this kind of public; such
a public would only get in the way of the lobbyists. So, of course, that
public was ill-served by the law and probably would have been even by a
law that was better crafted and less plagued by magical thinking about the
evolution of alternative economic models for telecommunications
businesses.
Outside the now-quaint environment of the 1996 Act, members of the
American public have a paradoxical problem. Whether or not we have
intersector competitors or even competing companies offering us our many
services, we certainly have a lot of communications and media options. We
are barraged relentlessly with new gizmos, more channels, more programs,
and the chance to Google them all. We also have unprecedented
opportunities to create our own media and to share it. And that vastly
increases the distraction level along with the opportunity.
There are so many competitors for our eyeballs and the precious
minutes of our attention in a day that we need ever newer filters-our
spamblockers, TiVos, Netflix, and Amazon recommendations lists,
MySpace, friends-and-family networks, metablogs-to cut through what
David Shenk2 calls "data smog." On the other hand, we lack reliable
sources of high-quality information about critically important issues and
even about what those issues might be until they suddenly pop up as
tragedy, as the New Orleans disaster did, or in episodic crises, as global
warming is doing. We pay ever higher monthly rental fees for an expanding
budget of communications services that make us ever more accessible to
advertisers, promoters, and telemarketers. We can now be overworked at
our virtual offices in the middle of the traffic jam that results from poor
local government planning after developer sweetheart deals that we knew
nothing about.
We have too much media, in one sense, and too few ways to make
sense of what comes out of it, in another. Our mass media seems to have
some trouble doing a basic job of providing public information before crisis
1. See generally JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927).
2. See generally DAVID SHENK, DATA SMOG: SURVIVING THE INFORMATION GLUT (1st
ed., Harper Edge 1997).
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hits and helping people understand rather than rant about differing points of
view. Investigative journalism teams have been cut back at newspapers and
networks; foreign correspondents are fewer than ever; science beats are
rare; "fair and balanced" means quoting "both sides" of a story, even if one
side has created the fiction of a two-sided debate; television news typically
features the fun, the violent, and the weird rather than the significant. These
are all predictable, if regrettable, aspects of a superheated commercial
media environment.
At the same time, we have in the Internet a growing range of ways to
create social networks-blogs and wikis added to Friendster and listservs-
that let us amplify rumor, innuendo, misinformation, aggrieved argument,
and sly, sardonic jokes. These are all understandable phenomena of
emerging networks that grow out of think-and-feel-alike communities. So
we lack widely shared, trusted venues to learn about big, long-term issues,
and we also lack the experience and experiment with social networks that
help us to share, debate, and deliberate about such issues.
We know what communications and media that serve the public can
look and sound like. They model constructive and respectful ways of
addressing each other. They encourage members of the public to interact.
They are open to new interaction. We even have a few, sadly limited,
demonstrations of explicitly public media in our noisy, polluted
communications environment. We have public radio and TV services
whose audiences were much more likely to believe that Saddam Hussein
was not linked to Osama Bin Laden than Fox News viewers were (as a poll
in Autumn 2003 taken by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at
the University of Maryland and Knowledge Networks showed).3 When
public broadcasters are not dunning viewers for donations or kissing up to
corporations for more funds (thanks to penny-wise-pound-foolish federal
policy), our public broadcasters frequently conduct exciting experiments in
public engagement. We have cable access channels that, despite their
pathetic reputations, often provide the only truly local programming on key
local issues such as school system expansion, utility regulation,
development codes, and, yes, cable franchise renewals. We have direct
broadcast satellite set-aside channels for nonprofit use, through which
many Americans have engaged with world culture and public affairs, for
instance through Link TV's Mosaic program rounding up TV news
programming in the Middle East. We have low-power radio stations that, in
spite of all the odds, serve microcommunities.
3. STEvEN KuLL ET AL., THE PIPA KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS POLL, MISPERCEPTIONS,
THE MEDIA AND THE IRAQ WAR (2003), available at http://65.109.167.118pipapdfloct03l
IrqMediaOct03_rpt.pdf.
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We also have some exciting glimmers of what public communications
systems can be in a digital era. Public Wi-Fi networks, open-source-based
Web and blogging platforms, and municipal broadband networks are a few
instances of more or less accidentally generated or demonstratation
examples of communication systems that encourage public participation.
Demonstration examples, niche experiments, and bleeding-edge forays:
that is where this society is actively nourishing public life with mass media
and communications.
While we may all celebrate the energy released into the marketplace
by competition (when it actually occurs), commercial competition in itself
promises and threatens nothing for public culture. It is our communications
and media policies that either promote or discourage public culture. And it
is a culture. Public culture is not spontaneous generation. Accident and the
unintended consequence may create new opportunities, but nothing
guarantees that those opportunities turn into cultural habit. Two decades
ago social scientist Ithiel de Sola Pool argued that emerging open
technologies would liberate enchained social forces and undercut the
traditional power of elites. Those "technologies of freedom" have arrived.
But they did not bring the vaunted release that many (not necessarily Pool)
imagined from regulatory responsibility.
Communication policies that promote public life are not utopian.
However, many have worked, though imperfectly, in the past. For instance,
obligations upon broadcasters to serve their communities with local
programs appropriate to the concerns they ascertained in deliberation with
community members were clumsy but also useful ways of getting
designated monopolists to pay some attention. As imperfect as such
regulations were, when faithfully enforced they resulted in active
relationships between media and local communities. The aggressive
retirement since 1980 of a range of mass media public interest obligations
and relaxation of structural regulations, including concentration limits, was
not accompanied by good-faith efforts to assess the consequences of their
dismissal. Nonetheless, their utility has not been retired, in part because
the ancient regime in which they were crafted has also not yet been retired.
As communications scholar Philip Napoli has pointed out, the public
interest standard has always been saluted at a high conceptual level, and
become a political skirmish at the level of application with not much in the
way of principles that help people operationalize the concept.6 The goal of
4. See generally ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983).
5. See Victoria F. Phillips, On Media Consolidation, the Public Interest, and Angels
Earning Wings, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 613-33 (2004).
6. See generally PHILIP M. NAPOLI, FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS POLICY:
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encouraging active public engagement with the issues that affect our joint
present and future is wholly nonpartisan and consistent with bedrock
political values.
Encouraging public life with media policy can have, in this
tempestuous era of digital opportunity, many facets. Approaches such as
encouraging entry of new players (that is, competition policies that are not
gifts in disguise to incumbents), government support for standards-setting,
and privileging open-access zones in spectrum policy are as rich in
possibilities for the benefit of public culture as more classic public interest
approaches. There are plenty of good ideas in circulation today by many of
the underfunded organizations representing stakeholders in the nonprofit
environment. Some of them include:
" Investment in public media (whether delivered by
broadcasting, cable, satellite, or emerging technologies) that
can afford to do the work of public engagement rather than
scouting for the next Suze Orman to rescue the budget during
pledge drives.
" Policies that encourage local mass media responsiveness to
local publics, including protection of cable franchise
requirements, community programming expectations, and
community needs ascertainment by broadcasters, license
renewal requirements exigent enough to allow regulators to
know what local engagement broadcasters have engaged in,
and license terms and ownership limitations appropriate to
encouraging local engagement.
" Policies that encourage universal broadband deployment and
access.
* Policies that reallocate spectrum so that more is available to
develop grassroots Wi-Fi and other unlicensed networks
permitting collaborative communication and content
generation.
" Policies that move toward a more flexible spectrum policy
with encouragement for noncommercial, public uses.
* Policies that encourage rather than punish public debate and
discussion, especially online and digitally. Currently, the use
of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation ("SLAPP")
by the powerful discourages such discussion. So do rigid and
high-bar intellectual property protectionist policies such as
broadcast flag, the Digital Copyright Millenium Act, and
PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS IN THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA (200 1).
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hardware and software initiatives developed in the private
sector to limit copying, but which in the process strangle the
ability to quote materials for public discussion.
* Policies that encourage inclusion, as the Americans with
Disabilities Act did with continuing and sometimes surprising
success for populations never originally considered.
Americans need to invest in their own democratic culture through
their tax dollars and their communications policies. Policymakers can be
leaders of that process. They need to participate in and learn from public
discussion and input--encouraged by hearings, public statements by
policymakers calling for input, and engagement with the broad nonprofit
sector-as they reshape the law. They need to seek policies that are
friendly to such processes as well. This can happen. The independent sector
is blooming with good suggestions from all political viewpoints. The
corporate sector is full of cross-currents and interests that can benefit from
a vital civil society. The alternative is the cynical invocation of public
interest by highly interested parties that made the making of the 1996 Act
such a travesty of public policymaking.
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